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With the digital organ designed and the prototype from Rockwell officially approved by Allen in January of 1971, we are at a point in the story of the digital organ where we were supposed to "live happily ever after." Well, this idyllic ending never materialized; life turned out to be much more complicated than expected. There is what I call the dark side of the story about the digital organ and its aftermath. This dark side doesn't in any way detract from the fact that the development of the digital organ was an extraordinary technical achievement as well as a business success.
It is important to know that details of this dark side came to light only after many years of legal proceedings. Most of the information upon which this part of the story is based came forth as a by-product of several litigations into which we were forced after the digital organ was developed. I'll talk about these litigations in other chapters. With the benefit of twenty additional years of experience and the information subsequently uncovered, I'm now in a much more knowledgeable position to talk about the "behind the scenes" aspects of the digital organ story. When the events were actually taking place, either I was deliberately kept in the dark or I was just too naive to put two and two together. I shall summarize the main points of this dark side story, at least as much of it as I've been able to piece together so far. Later, I shall go into a little more detail.
Ralph Deutsch, until he came up with the digital organ idea, appeared to be one of countless technical people typically employed by a large, high-tech corporation. In the mid-1960s, well into his career, he had neither established any individual claim to fame among his peers, nor did he win any points as a team player. In fact, he had a reputation for being "difficult" and exhibiting childish behavior in his contacts with co-workers. As I see it, fate presented him with a unique opportunity to rise from obscurity — the digital organ idea. Because Rockwell, his employer, was receptive to ideas such as this at the time, it seems to me that he realized that if he played his cards right he could achieve personal "success" via the digital organ. I have no problem with this part. However, I was to be greatly troubled by the traits Deutsch exhibited in trying to achieve his "success." Later events would convince me that these traits suggested vindictiveness, mendacity, and Machiavellianism. Even more troubling was the apparent ease with which such an individual could manipulate people and institutions — including our legal system.
After Deutsch sold the digital organ idea to his management, he then had to get someone to engineer it and someone to pay for it because he was apparently much better at theory and hyperbole than he was at the practical and factual. Excellent engineers were already available from the winding down of the space program — including George Watson whom I mentioned in another chapter. Money to pay for Deutsch's idea had to come from the outside — from an organ manufacturer. Deutsch approached most of the leading organ manufacturers except Allen; they all refused to undertake the development project. In desperation and under pressure from his management, he finally approached Allen and got his funding. Apparently, he was reluctant to deal with Allen.
Being "stuck" with Allen as a partner was probably very frustrating for Deutsch. I was an "active" partner who had the audacity to stand up to Deutsch's intense protestations when serious "organ" issues arose. Unknown to me at the time, Deutsch presented to his management his own plan for Allen Organ which exaggerated the projected sales of digital organs. Although I had no knowledge of his "plan," he portrayed it to his management as "the" plan. As my own plan for the "Allen" digital organ was not congruent with his, I was obviously a thorn in his side.
I was tolerated out of necessity until I approved the prototype and turned over the development funds to Rockwell. At this point, beginning in the spring of 1971, Deutsch's interest in Allen Organ waned as his attention turned to the awakening giant overseas — Japan.
Allen had paid for and, therefore, legally controlled the use of the digital organ technology. By contract, Allen had a right of first refusal on subsequent digital music developments at Rockwell. As president of Allen, it was incumbent on me to rigorously protect Allen's rights to the new technology and exercise good judgment in controlling how it should be used. Deutsch's plans revolved around Japan; mine did not. Therefore, I did not go along with Deutsch's ideas. This must have been terribly frustrating to him in his self-appointed role as "Mr. Digital Organ." How could Deutsch exploit the digital organ technology for his own self-interest with Allen standing in the way? I hope that this question will be at least partially answered in the pages that follow.